Dear Editors of the Intercultural Human Rights Law Review,
I am writing to submit my manuscript, “Rights of Robots: Moral and Legal Status of AI Systems,” for consideration for publication in Volume 22 of the Intercultural Human Rights Law Review.
The article examines one of the emerging questions at the intersection of artificial intelligence, moral philosophy, and law: whether artificial intelligence systems and robots can, or should, be recognized as holders of moral or legal rights. Rather than treating “robot rights” simply as a technological question, the article approaches the issue as a problem concerning the foundations of moral status, legal personality, human responsibility, and the meaning of personhood.
The manuscript examines several possible criteria for attributing moral status to AI systems, including intelligence, embodiment, language proficiency, sentience, goals, self-awareness, and the capacity for reciprocal relationships. It argues that intelligence alone provides insufficient grounds for attributing intrinsic moral status and gives particular attention to language as an indicator of social interaction and potential moral agency. The article also considers anthropomorphism and the risks associated with treating AI systems as human-like persons.
A central part of the manuscript concerns the distinction between moral status and legal status. Through discussion of cases including the humanoid robot Sophia and AI systems involved in decision-making, the article argues that granting a particular legal status to an AI system would not necessarily make it equivalent to a natural person. Rather, legal recognition may function as a regulatory mechanism for allocating rights, duties, liability, and responsibility among human actors, corporations, and technological systems.
The article further examines the possibility of AI functioning as a limited moral agent or moral assistant. Drawing on the distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to machine morality, it argues that AI may assist human beings in moral decision-making without thereby becoming a fully autonomous moral subject. The manuscript ultimately maintains that responsibility for ethical decisions remains with human beings, while AI may occupy an intermediate position between an instrument and a person. These conclusions are developed through conceptual and categorical analysis, linguistic analysis, case studies, and ethical reflection. The manuscript itself identifies its broader significance as theological and philosophical, connecting the question of AI with fundamental questions concerning human nature, morality, and the limits of technological development.
I believe the manuscript is particularly relevant to the Intercultural Human Rights Law Review because the question of AI rights challenges established understandings of legal personality, human dignity, responsibility, and the scope of rights. It also raises an important intercultural dimension: the categories through which societies understand personhood, embodiment, intelligence, language, and moral community may influence how future legal systems respond to increasingly autonomous technological systems.
Thank you very much for considering my manuscript for Volume 22. I would be honored to have the opportunity to contribute to the Intercultural Human Rights Law Review and to participate in the journal's discussion of emerging challenges to human rights and legal theory in the age of artificial intelligence.
Sincerely,
Oleg V. Pavenkov, PhD
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Alliance University
